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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(i), Utah Code Ann. (1992 Repl.).
The appeal is from a final judgment, dated August 14, 1992, of
the Sixth Judicial District Court for Sanpete County, State of
Utah.

Notice of Appeal was filed September 4, 1992.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
ISSUE I
CAN THE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION BE ASSERTED TO DEFEAT THE
EQUITABLE DIVISION OF PROPERTY ISSUED A DIVORCE PROCEEDING?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the lien created in a divorce proceeding is superior
to a homestead claim is a question of law.

A conclusion of law

is reviewed for correctness without any special deference to the
decision of the trial court. Western Kane County Special Service
District No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co.. 744 P.2d 1376, 1378 (Utah
1987).
ISSUE II
IS AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE A PROPER PROCEDURE FOR
ENFORCEMENT OF A LIEN CREATED BY THE PROPERTY DIVISION
IN THE DIVORCE PROCEEDING?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court in a divorce action has considerable
6
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discretion in equitably adjusting the financial and property
interests of the parties.

The court's distribution of property

is endowed with a presumption of validity should not be disturbed
on appeal unless it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of
discretion.

Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988);

Argyle v. Arcryle. 688 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah 1984); Rasband v.
Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1988),

To the extent

the question whether the nature of the proceeding is proper is a
question of law it should be reviewed under the correctness of
error standard. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d at 1378.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES TO BE INTERPRETED
Utah Constitution
Article I, section 7. Due Process of Law
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
Article I, section 11. Courts Open--Redress of Injuries.
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial
or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
Article XXII, section 1.

Homestead exemption.

The Legislature shall provide by statute for an exemption of a
homestead, which may consist of one or more parcels of lands,
together with the appurtenances and improvements thereon, from
sale on execution.
Utah Code Annotated
Section 30-3-5 (1). Disposition of property
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include
7
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in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, and
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree
of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of the
dependent children; and
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, and order
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate
health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the
dependent children.
Section 30-3-5 (3). Courts to have continuing jurisdiction
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent
changes or new orders for the support and maintenance of the
parties, the custody of the children and their support,
maintenance, health and dental care, or the distribution of the
property as is reasonable and necessary.
Section 78-28-3. Homestead Exemption--Excepted Obligations-"Head of Family" defined-- Water Rights and interests--Conveyance
of Homestead--Married homestead claimant--Sale and disposition of
homestead--property right for federal tax purposes.
(1) A homestead consisting of property in this state shall be
exempt in an amount no exceeding $8,000 in value for a head of
family, $2,000 in value for a spouse, and $500 in value for each
other dependent. A homestead may be claimed in either or both of
the following:
(a) one or more parcels of real property together with
appurtenances and improvements; or
(b) a mobile home in which the claimant resides.
(2) A homestead shall be exempt from judicial liens and from
levy, execution, or forced sale, except upon the following
obligations:
(a) statutory liens for taxes and assessments on the
property;
(b) security interests in the property and judicial liens
for debts created for the purchase price of such property;
and
(c) judicial liens obtained on debts created by failure to
provide support or maintenance for dependent children.
(3) The term "head of family" includes a single individual with
or without dependents or a husband or wife when the claimant is
married; but in no case are both husband and wife entitled each
to claim a homestead except as otherwise provided by this
chapter.
(4) Water rights and interest, either in the form of corporate
stock or otherwise, owned by the homestead claimant shall be

8
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exempt from execution to the extent that such rights and
interests are necessarily employed in supplying water to the
homestead for domestic and irrigating purposes; but such rights
and interests shall not be exempt from calls or assessments and
sale by the corporations issuing the stock.
(5) When a homestead is conveyed by the owner of the property,
the conveyance shall not be subject the property to any lien to
which it would not be subject in the hands of the owner; and the
proceeds of any sale, to the amount of the exemption existing at
the time of the sale, shall be exempt from levy, execution, or
other process for one year after the receipt of the proceeds by
he person entitled to the exemption.
(6) If the homestead claimant is married, the homestead may be
selected from the separate property of the husband, or with the
consent of the wife from her separate property.
(7) A sale and disposition of one homestead shall not prevent
the selection or purchase of another.
(8) For purposes of any claim or action for taxes brought by
the Internal Revenue Service, a homestead exemption claimed on
real property in this state is considered to be a property right.

9
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOSEPH WILES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 92-0459-CA

JEAN B. WILES,
Defendant-Appellant,

APPELLEE'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the final judgment, dated August 14,
1992, of the Honorable Judge Don V. Tibbs of the Sixth Judicial
Court for Sanpete County, State of Utah.
Joseph and Jean Wiles were divorced January 29, 1981.

( See

Trial Court's Findings of Fact, hereinafter "Findings", at 2.)
By its divorce decree, the court made an equitable division of
the marital property and awarded Jean, the Defendant, certain
property, including real property consisting of approximately 0.6
acres and the mobile home which is located on the real property.
(Findings, at 1-2.)

As part of the property division, the court

also awarded Joseph, the Plaintiff, a lien on the real property
in the amount of $6000.00 plus interest at the rate of 6% from
January 21, 1981 until paid.

(Findings, at 2.)

The Divorce

Decree stated that if the obligation was not paid by the
Defendant by December 21, 1991, the Plaintiff could foreclose the
10
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lien at his option.

(Findings, at 2.)

The Defendant has continued to reside on the property since
the time of the divorce but has paid none of the obligation.
(Findings, at 2.)

On February 6, 1991, the Defendant filed a

declaration of homestead with the Sanpete County Recorder
encompassing the property which is subject to the lien.
(Findings, at 2.)

On July 15, 1992, the court issued an Order to

Show Cause, requesting the Defendant to appear an show cause why
the lien awarded in the Divorce Decree should not be foreclosed
and the property sold to satisfy the obligation.
Show Cause, at 1.)

(See Order to

At a hearing on the order, the Defendant

argued that the lien could not be foreclosed because the property
had been claimed as a homestead and was, therefore, exempt from
judicial lien and forced sale.

The court denied the Defendant's

motion to dismiss, finding that this was "not a proper case for
the filing of the Homestead Exemption."

(Findings, at 2.)

The

court also found that allowing the Homestead Exemption to defeat
this lien "would defeat the purposes of the Divorce Decree and .
. .frustrate the Court's ability to divide the property in a
divorce proceeding."

(Findings, at 2.)

Judgment was awarded in

favor of the Plaintiff for $10,140.00, consisting of principle in
the amount of $6000.00 and interest accrued from January 21, 1981
in the amount of $4,140.00. The court also awarded the Plaintiff
a Decree of Foreclosure and ordered the real property sold.
(Judgment, at 1-2.)
The Defendant acknowledges that the money judgment is
11
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correct but appeals the foreclosure order.

(Appellant's Brief,

at 6.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. THE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION CANNOT BE USED TO DEFEAT THE PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND INTERESTS AWARDED IN A DIVORCE PROCEEDING PURSUANT TO
THE COURT'S AUTHORITY TO MAKE AN EQUITABLE DIVISION OF THE
MARITAL PROPERTY.
The trial court in the present case held that the homestead
exemption could not be used to defeat the equitable division of
property ordered in a divorce proceeding.

This issue has never

directly been addressed by Utah appellate courts but has been
addressed in many other jurisdictions.

Several principles, which

are consistent with Utah law, emerge from these cases. The
principles dictate that property interests awarded to one spouse
in a divorce proceeding be superior to the homestead claim of the
other spouse.
First, the homestead law is a family shield which should not
be employed by either spouse to wrong the other.

Second, the

homestead exemption cannot be used to frustrate the power of the
court to make an equitable division of property in a divorce
proceeding.

Finally, the situation in this case, where the

Plaintiff's homestead interest was conveyed to the Defendant
subject to a lien, is analogous to the situation where property
is conveyed subject to a lien which secures payment of the
purchase price.

Purchase price obligations are specifically

excepted from the homestead exemption.
II. THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WAS A PROPER PROCEDURE FOR
ENFORCEMENT OF A LIEN CREATED BY THE PROPERTY DIVISION IN THE
DIVORCE PROCEEDING.
After a decree of divorce is rendered, the trial court has
continuing jurisdiction to make new orders for the distribution
13
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of the property as is reasonable and necessary.

Therefore, it

was not necessary that the Plaintiff file a separate action to
enforce the provisions of the Divorce Decree and foreclose on the
real property.

£n order to show cause is a common proceeding to

enforce the provisions of a divorce decree.
The Defendant has not been denied access to the courts.

She

argues in her brief that she was denied the opportunity to
request modification by the nature of the proceeding.

But it is

obvious from the record that the only reason modification was not
considered by the court at any time during the pendency of this
divorce matter is that the Defendant chose not to request it.
The judicial procedure used in this case is based on fairness and
equality, and the Defendant has not been arbitrarily deprived of
effective remedies designed to protect basic individual rights.
She has had her "day in court"; initially at the original divorce
trial and subsequently at the hearing on the order to show cause.
At the hearing she had the opportunity of being heard and
introducing evidence to establish her defenses to the
foreclosure.

Having freely chosen not to assert her claimed

right to modification of the divorce decree she cannot now
complain that the opportunity was denied her.

14
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION CANNOT BE USED TO DEFEAT THE PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND INTERESTS AWARDED IN A DIVORCE PROCEEDING PURSUANT TO
THE COURT'S AUTHORITY TO MAKE AN EQUITABLE DIVISION OF THE
MARITAL PROPERTY.
The Utah Constitution requires that the "Legislature shall
provide by statute for an exemption of a homestead . . . from
sale on execution." Utah Const, art. XXII, § 1. The Legislature's
response to this edict, the statutory homestead exemption, is
presently codified as part of the Utah Exemptions Act.
Ann. §§ 78-23-3, 78-23-4 (1992 Repl.).

Utah Code

The exemption provides

that "[a] homestead shall be exempt from judicial lien and from
levy, execution, or forced sale."

Id. at § 78-23-3(2).

The homestead exemption is not absolute.

According to the

statute, the homestead is not exempt from lien, execution or
forced sale upon three types of obligations: statutory liens for
taxes and assessments on the property, security interests or
judicial liens for debts created for the purchase price of the
property, and judicial liens obtained on debts created by failure
to provide support for dependent children.
3(2)(a)-(c).

Id. at § 78-23-

The statute has been interpreted to except all

consensual security interests, whether they are the result of
either purchase money or of non-purchase money obligations, from
the scope of the homestead exemption.

P.I.E. Employees Federal

Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, 1152 (Utah 1988).
Furthermore, it has been held that the homestead exemption does
15
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not protect property from execution where the underlying
obligation arose from the debtor's fraud and the fraudulently
obtained funds were used to retire delinquencies on the property
claimed as a homestead.

This is true even though the situation

is not an exception provided in the statute.

Tabish v. Smith.

572 P.2d 378 (Utah 1977).
The trial court in the present case held that the homestead
exemption could not be used to defeat the equitable division of
property ordered in a divorce proceeding.

This issue has never

directly been addressed by Utah appellate courts but decisions in
many other jurisdictions have held that property interests
granted to a person in a divorce proceeding are superior to the
homestead right claimed by the person's former spouse.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has ruled that the homestead
exemption cannot be asserted to defeat the claim of a former
spouse for alimony, stating:
The husband's right to an exempt homestead cannot, we
think, be asserted against the wife, who has been
forced by his aggression to leave his domicile, and
who, in an action for divorce, has obtained a judgment
for alimony against him. The homestead law is a family
shield, and cannot be employed by either spouse to
wrong the other.
Best v. Zutavern. 53 Neb. 604, 74 N.W. 64 (1898); see also In re
Holtzhauser. 117 B.R. 519, 521 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990)(for the same
reasons, a claim for child support is not defeated by a homestead
claim) .
The Supreme Court of Kansas has stated that "a lien upon a
husband's property designed to secure the payment of court16
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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decreed alimony to his former wife will overcome a homestead
claim,"

Bohl v. Bohl. 670 P.2d 1344, 1347 (Kan. 1983) (citing

Blankenship v. Blankenship. 19 Kan. 159 (1877)).

The Bohl Court

went on to hold that a lien imposed to enforce a division of
property will also overcome a homestead claim because

!!

[w]hile

the term alimony once represented the husband's common law duty
of support and was a distinct concept from property division,
modern decisions recognize the distinction has been eliminated
over the years. The terminology use to describe the award is no
longer significant."

Id.

The Oklahoma Supreme Court has ruled that "[t]he homestead
law is a family shield, and cannot be employed by either spouse
to wrong the other. Accordingly it is generally held that a
decree for alimony may be declared a lien on the family
homestead, even though title thereof is vested in the husband . .
. ." Haven v. Trammel, 193 P. 631 (Okl. 1920).

In reaching this

decision the Oklahoma Court quoted an early Kansas decision
concerning the power of the court to authorize the sale of
homestead property to satisfy a lien for alimony:
The power to take the homestead from the husband and
assign the same to the wife, is the exercise of greater
power than making a sum allowed as alimony a lien upon
all the property of the husband, and ordering the same
sold to discharge the lien. The greater power included
the less; and we find no error as to the sale of the
homestead . . . .
Id. (quoting Blankenship v. Blankenship. 19 Kan. 159 (1877)).
In Oklahoma, as in Kansas, the rule applies not only to
liens for alimony but also liens that have been established on
17
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homestead property to effect property divisions in divorce
proceedings•

A Federal Bankruptcy Court in Oklahoma held that

"it is clear that under State law, the Oklahoma homestead
exemption cannot be used to defeat property rights and interests
awarded in divorce proceedings to accomplish fair property
divisions between the parties thereto."

In re Scott. 12 B.R.

613, 616 (Bankr. W.D. Okl. 1981).
Court decisions interpreting Iowa law have reached results
similar to those interpreting the homestead exemptions of Kansas,
Oklahoma and Nebraska, but the decisions are based on somewhat
different reasoning.

The Iowa homestead law provides that a

homestead is exempt from judicial sale "where there is no special
declaration of statute to the contrary."

Iowa Code § 561.16.

The Iowa Supreme Court has recognized that Iowa Code § 598.21,
the statute which grants Iowa courts the power to make an
equitable distribution in a divorce proceeding, "is a 'special
declaration of statute' which makes the homestead laws
ineffective to bar judicial sale or other disposition of the
homestead in adjusting the parties' property rights."
v. Winter. 263 N.W.2d 892, 894 (Iowa 1978);

Kobriger

see also In re

Marriage of Tierny. 263 N.W.2d 533, 534 (Iowa 1978); In re
Reindeers. 138 B.R. 937, 942 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1992); In re
Adams. 29 B.R. 452, 454 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982).
Texas courts have concluded that "in a divorce action a lien
may be placed upon a spouse's real property homestead to secure
the payment of the amount awarded to the other spouse for that
18
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other spouse's homestead interest."

Lettieri v. Lettieri, 654

S.W.2d 554, 559 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983)(citing Wierzchula v.
Wierzchula, 623 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981)).
Lettieri the spouses were co-owners of the property.

In
The divorce

decree awarded the husband title and possession of the home and
the wife a money judgment as compensation for her interests in
the property.

At the moment of divorce the wife's ownership

interest in the property was converted to a money judgment and
the judgment specifically created her lien on the property.

The

court stated:
The husband can clear the lien easily by paying the
money judgment awarded to the wife. If he elects not
to and the wife is forced to foreclose her lien, this
in no way would harm the husband nor would it be a
violation of the homestead exemption. The homestead
exemption was also the wife's entitlement prior to the
time that the divorce was granted, a right which she
had taken away from her by the court, and for which she
was simultaneously awarded a judgment lien as
compensation.
Id.
Several principles, which are consistent with Utah law,
emerge from these cases. The principles dictate that property
interests awarded to one spouse in a divorce proceeding be
superior to the homestead claim of the other spouse.
First, the homestead law is a family shield which should not
be employed by either spouse to wrong the other.
Zutavern, 53 Neb. 604, 74 N.W. 64 (1898).

See Best v.

The purpose of the

homestead exemption is to protect the family from destitution
which could result from foreclosure or forced sale by outside
creditors.

Panagopulos v. Manning, 93 Utah 198, 203, 69 P.2d
19
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614, 617 (193 7).

The policy considerations in favor of the

homestead law do not exist when the obligation which the
homestead claimant seeks to avoid is owed to another family
member,

Utah's homestead statute explicitly acknowledges this

concept when it provides that homestead property is not exempt
from execution or forced sale to satisfy "judicial liens obtained
on debts created by failure to provide support or maintenance for
dependent children,"
Repl.).

Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-3 (2) (c) (1992

The same rationale which causes the homestead claim of

one spouse to be inferior to claim of the other spouse for child
support or alimony, dictates that the homestead claim also yield
to the property interests which are awarded to the other spouse
in a divorce proceeding.

See

Bohl v. Bohl, 670 P.2d 1344, 1347

(Kan. 1983); In re Scott. 12 B.R. 613, 616 (Bankr. W.D. Okl.
1981); In re Holtzhauser. 117 B.R. 519, 521 (Bankr. D. Neb.
1990).

Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that the Defendant

could not assert the homestead exemption to defeat the property
interests which were granted to the Plaintiff in the Divorce
Decree.
Second, the homestead exemption cannot be used to frustrate
the power of the court to make an equitable division of property
in a divorce proceeding.

Under Utah law, the court in a divorce

proceeding is "empowered to make such distributions [of marital
property] as are just and equitable, and may compel such
conveyances as are necessary to that end."

Jackson v. Jackson.

617 P.2d 338, 340-41 (Utah 1980); see also Utah Code Ann. §30-320
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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5(1) (1989 Repl.).

This power includes the authority to grant to

one spouse an interest in property which was the separate
property of the other spouse prior to the marriage.
Workman, 652 P.2d 931, 933 (Utah 1982).

Workman v.

The power to take the

homestead from one spouse and assign the same to the other
spouse, is the exercise of greater power than making a sum
allowed in favor of the husband a lien upon the property granted
to the wife, and ordering the same sold to discharge the lien.
The greater power includes the less and cannot be frustrated by a
homestead claim.

See Blankenship v. Blankenship, 19 Kan. 159

(1877).
The statutory exceptions to the Utah homestead exemption do
not include an exception for

"special declaration of statute to

the contrary" comparable to the exception found in the Iowa
statute.
1978).

See Kobriger v. Winter, 263 N.W.2d 892, 894 (Iowa

It is important to note, however, that the Utah code does

grant divorce courts the authority to make divisions of marital
property.

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (1989 Repl.).

The

homestead exemption should be inoperative to the extent that it
interferes with ability of the courts to exercise this specific
grant of authority.

To allow the Defendant to assert the

homestead exemption in this case would thwart the divorce court's
power to divide the marital property and cannot be allowed.
Finally, the document which gave rise to the Plaintiff's
lien was the Divorce Decree.

It was this same document which

operated to convey the Plaintiff's interest in the homestead to
21
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the Defendant.

Thus, it may be said that the property was

conveyed to the Defendant subject to the Plaintiff's lien to
secure payment of the Plaintiff's share of the property
settlement.

This situation is comparable to the situation where

property is conveyed subject to a lien which secures payment of
the purchase price.
W.D. Okl. 1981).

See In re Scott, 12 B.R. 613, 615 (Bankr.

According to the Utah statute, a homestead is

not exempt from forced sale to satisfy "debts created for the
purchase price of such property."

Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-3(2) (b)

(1992 Repl.).
The Wiles were co-owners of the property, the Divorce Decree
awarded the Defendant title and possession of the mobile home and
lot and the Plaintiff a money judgment as compensation for his
interests in the property.

At the moment of divorce, the

Plaintiff's ownership interest in the property was converted to a
money judgment and the judgment specifically created his lien on
the property.

As phrased by the Texas Court of Appeals, "the

homestead exemption was also the [husband's] entitlement prior to
the time the divorce was granted, a right which [he] had taken
away from [him] by the court, and for which [he] was
simultaneously awarded a judgment lien as compensation."
Lettieri v. Lettieri. 654 S.W.2d 554, 559 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
The Defendant could have cleared the lien by paying the money
judgement, the validity of which she does not dispute.

She has

elected not to pay, forcing the Plaintiff to foreclose his lien.
This foreclosure is not a violation of the homestead exemption.
22
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POINT II
THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WAS A PROPER PROCEDURE FOR ENFORCEMENT OF
A LIEN CREATED BY THE PROPERTY DIVISION IN THE DIVORCE
PROCEEDING.
The Defendant contends that the order to show cause
proceeding denied her access to the courts.

She asserts that an

order to show cause is not a proper procedure for foreclosing a
lien and that use of the order to show cause denied her the
opportunity to petition the court to modify the property
provisions of the divorce decree.

There is no indication in the

record, however, that the Defendant was denied the opportunity,
either at the hearing on the order to show cause or before, to
assert that her change in health would justify modification of
the property division.
After a decree of divorce is rendered, the trial court "has
continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders
for . . . the distribution of the property as is reasonable and
necessary.

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1989 Repl.).

Therefore,

it was not necessary that the Plaintiff file a separate action to
enforce the provisions of the Divorce Decree and foreclose on the
real property.

An order to show cause is a common proceeding to

enforce the provisions of a divorce decree. See, e.g.. Kanzee v.
Kanzee, 668 P.2d 495, 496 (Utah 1983); Chandler v. West. 610 P.2d
1299, 1300 (Utah 1980).
The Divorce Decree in the present case is dated January 29,
1981 and provides that the lien in favor of the Plaintiff could
not be foreclosed until December 21, 1991. During the ten-year
23
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interim, the Defendant made no payments on her $6000.00
obligation but, on the other hand, never petitioned the court to
modify the Divorce Decree.

The record does not reveal when the

Defendant began to experience health problems.

But presumably it

was before she filed the homestead exemption on February 6, 1990.
Thus, the Defendant's claimed change in circumstance occurred, at
the latest, nearly two years before the date designated in the
Divorce Decree for foreclosure on the lien and two and one-half
years before the Plaintiff requested the order to show cause to
enforce the lien in July of 1992. Rather than request that the
lien be modified or set aside, however, the Defendant chose
instead to rely on her homestead exemption.

(See Appellant's

Brief, at 12.)
In July 1992, the Defendant was ordered to appear and show
cause why the lien granted in the parties' divorce decree should
not be enforced and the real property sold to satisfy the lien.
The Defendant could have countered with an order to show cause
seeking to modify the Divorce Decree based on changed
circumstances, but did not.
495, 496 (Utah 1983).

See e.g. Kanzee v. Kanzee. 668 P.2d

The Defendant had further opportunity to

seek the equitable power of the court to modify the lien at the
hearing on the order to show cause.

The purpose of the order to

show cause is to afford the responding party an opportunity to
present to the court facts and reasons why the relief sought by
the order should not be granted.

56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, Rules

and Orders § 34. At the hearing the Defendant argued her claimed
24
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homestead exemption as a defense to the foreclosure but did not
request that the court modify the decree.
The Defendant argues in her brief that she was denied the
opportunity to request modification by the nature of the
proceeding.

But it is obvious from the record that the only

reason modification was not considered by the court at any time
during the pendency of this divorce matter is that the Defendant
chose not to request it.
Although the Defendant has never requested that the decree
be modified, she argues in her brief that her affidavit in
support of the motion to dismiss made a prima facie case for
modification of the property provisions of the Divorce Decree.

A

trial court sitting in a divorce matter retains continuing
jurisdiction to make such modifications in the initial decree of
divorce as it deems just and equitable.

Nevertheless, any

modification must be justified by some change in circumstance of
the parties.

Foulger v. Foulger. 626 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981);

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1989 Repl.).

Where property settlements

are in question the trial court should be more reluctant to grant
a modification.

The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "property

settlements are entitled to a greater sanctity than alimony and
support payments in proceedings to modify divorce decrees."
Chandler v. West, 610 P.2d 1299, 1300 (Utah 1982) (citing Land v.
Land/ 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980)).
Even if it is assumed that the issue of modification was
properly placed before the trial court it is apparent that the
25
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trial court was not persuaded that the Defendant's change in
circumstance justified modification or elimination of the lien.
After hearing the evidence the court ordered the lien foreclosed
and the property sold.

The trial court has considerable

discretion in equitably adjusting the financial and property
interests of the parties to a divorce and the court's resolution
of those interests should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is
clearly unjust or a clear abuse of discretion.

Gill v. Gill, 718

P.2d 779 (Utah 1986).
The Defendant claims that the actions of the trial court
denied her access to the courts as guaranteed by Article I,
section 11 of the Utah Constitution.
is unclear.
courts."

The basis for this argument

The Defendant has not been denied "access to the

Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985).

As explained above, the only reason that the court has not
considered modification of the Divorce Decree is that the
Defendant has never requested such action.

Furthermore, the

judicial procedure used in this case is "based on fairness and
equality", and the Defendant has not been "arbitrarily deprived
of effective remedies designed to protect basic individual
rights."

Id.

The Open Courts provision is closely related in both
historical origin and constitutional function to the Due Process
Clause of Article I, section 7.

Id.

Thus, the "remedy by due

course of law" guaranteed by section 11 is similar to the "due
process of law" guaranteed by section 7.

Utah Const, art. I, §§
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7, 11. Due process requires timely notice and an opportunity to
be heard.

The Utah Supreme Court has explained the due process

guarantee as follows:
Many attempts have been made to further define "due
process" but they all resolve into the thought that a
party shall have his day in court--that is each party
shall have the right to a hearing before a competent
court, with the privilege of being heard and
introducing evidence to establish his cause or defense,
after which comes judgment upon the record thus made.
Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 316 (Utah 1945).

There are

no decisions to indicate that the specific guarantee of access to
the courts found in Article I, section 11 provides any greater
protection than the general due process requirement found in
Article I, section 7.

See Celebrity Club. Inc. v. Utah Liquor

Control Comm'n. 657 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah 1982).
The Defendant has had her "day in court"; initially at the
original divorce trial and subsequently at the hearing on the
order to show cause. At the hearing she had the opportunity of
being heard and introducing evidence to establish her defenses to
the foreclosure.

Having freely chosen not to assert her claimed

right to modification of the divorce decree she cannot now
complain that the opportunity was denied her.

CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly determined that the Plaintiff's
lien is superior to the Defendant's homestead claim.
Furthermore, an order to show cause was a proper proceeding to
enforce the provisions of the Divorce Decree.

Therefore, the
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judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted/^

Paul R. Frischknecht
Attorney for Appellee
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